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PRECIS~ OCCIDENTAL UNIVERSITY TALK 
M 
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I. INTROD UCTI ON 
II. Om exper ience in Iraq 
III. Iraq suffers from many difficult problems: Economic reconstruction and 
development, infrastructural damage, poor security. In short, Iraq suffers all 
the ills of a developing country, plus special problems dumped on it by the 
US invasion, the UN embargo, and the years of Saddam's oppression i ~ '1"'/ S<u~ W<J..<, 
[describe] 
IV . The social problem of interest: The inadequacy of the draft constitution to 
provide adequate instruments of governance to solve these problems . 
A. Preliminarily: 
1. In the midst of 'insurgency' (call it civil war) they seek to write 
a constitution. 
2. Consider a constitution not primarily as drawing 1 ine between 
private right and public power, but as a charter of government. 
An adequate charter of government must resolve the problems 
history has placed on the country's agenda. 
a. Drafting and enacting laws, and oversight of 
Government -
(l) Within limits imposed by RoL 
(2) Transparently,+ accountability, participation 
(a) Especially, justificat ion in terms of reason 
informed by experience - what Ronald 
Dworkin calls 'pub lie reasons' . 
b . Impleme nting laws capably -
(1) Within limits imposed by Constitution 
(2) Within limits imposed by RoL 
(3) Transparently,+ accountability, participation in 
decision -making . 
c. Adjudicating disp utes independently -
(1) Within limits imposed by RoL 
(2) Transparent ly, accountability 
d. Ensure that constituti on provides for dealing with 
specific major problems on histmy's agenda (e.g., in 
Iraq, rec onstruc tion of the econ omy, reconstruction of 
infrastructure , security .) 
3. Constitutions, like othe r laws, main ly states commands, 
pem1issions and proh ibitions. It should do so clearly and in a 
form that its expected readers will un derstand (i.e., in ordinary 
language .) 
B. Surface appearances of the social problem of interest 
1. The indefiniteness of the draft constitution. Their results of 
their efforts are pitiably weak. In particular , after months of 
trying and an army of foreign consultants in aid , they have 
Ii produced constitution iny hich rnany,_perhap most of the 
U critical provisions seem incurably vague and indeterminate. In 
short , it is hard to believe that the draft constitution , if enacted 
and implemented as written , will end by organizing a truly 
democratic government organized in a way that empowers it to 
address the leading problems that Iraq faces. This it 
accomplished by three devices: 
Many, perhaps most provisions have little or no content, 
but require definition by the new COR (a matter of poor 
drafting). 
(1) For example: 67 of 139 Articles in terms require 
legislation to define their meaning; most do not 
come into effect until COR enactes a relevant 
enabling law. (Note that existing law may cover 
some of these; see Art. 127). See, e.g., 
(a) Art. 48(3) ("3rd - Conditions for candidates 
and voters and everything connected to 
elections will be regulated by law"); 
(b) Art. 61(1) ("The rights and privileges given 
to the president of the Council of 
Representatives and his deputies and the 
members of the council shall be fixed by 
law"); 
(c) ~'1st -A legislative counci] called 
~~rncil of Union" will be established 
and will include representatives of regions 
and provinces to examine bills related to 
I 
regions and provinces. 2nd - The makeup of 
the council, the conditions for membership 
and all things related to it will be organized 
by law" ; 
(d) Art. 90(1) ("The Supreme Federal Court is 
an independent judicial body, financially 
and administratively, its work and its duties 
will be defined b law") 
( e) Art. 95 ("Judges shall not be impeached 
except in the cases determined by law; the 
law will also specify the rules pertaining to 
V 
V 
them and regulate disciplinary actions 
against them"; 
(f) Article 100 ("The Su reme Co · ssion for 
Human Rights, ~ d the Supreme 
Independent Commission for Elections and 
the Integrity Agency are considered 
independent associations subject to the 
supervision of the Council of 
Representatives. Their wo · gu1a: e by 
la~ :'). 
(g) Art. 102 ("An agency shall be established 
called the Institution of the Martyrs , 
affiliated to the Cabinet, and its operations 
and powers will be regulated by law"). 
(h) See especially the provisions concerning the 
Supreme Judiciary Council - and its 
enormous power , (including the power to 
nominate head and members of the Supreme 
Federal Court and the Federal Cassation 
Court), as follows: 
"FIRST: The Supreme Judiciary 
Council 
Article (88): The Supreme Judiciary 
Council will administer judicial 
affairs in accordance with the law. 
"Article (89): The Supreme Judiciary 
Council will exercise the following 
powers: 
1st - administering and 
supervising the federal 
judic iary system. 
2nd - nominating the head and 
members of the Supreme 
Federal Court and presenting 
@-ii b. 
their names to parliament for 
endorsement. 
3rd - nominating the head of 
the Federal Cassation Court, 
the chief prosecutor and the 
head of the Judiciary 
Inspection Department, and 
presenting them to parliament 
for approval. 
4th - proposing the annual 
budget for the federal judiciary 
system and presenting it to 
parliament for approval.") 
(These constitute all the references in the 
Constitution concerning the Supreme Judiciary 
Council.) 
The language of the constitution is so vague (at least in 
translation) that the official or judge that interprets it has 
very wide discretion. See, e.g., 
I ~r,,..P, . , ) ( 1 ) V (~\,.,OCY"" Art. 2(1) ("Islam is the official religion of the state and is a basic source of legislation: 
V 
(2) 
(a) No law can be passed that contradicts the 
undisputed rules of Islam. 
(b) No law can be passed that contradicts the 
principles of democracy. 
(c) No law can be passed that contradicts the 
rights and basic freedoms outlined in this 
constitution"). 
Art 35 (" 1st - (a) The freedom and dignity of a 
person are protected"); 
(3) Art. 36 ("The state guarantees, as long as it does 
not violate public order and morality: l st - the 
freedom of expressing opinion by all means. 2nd -
the freedom of press, publishing, media and 
~ C. 
distribution. 3rd - freedom of assembly and 
peaceful protest will be organized by law" 
[ emphasis added]); 
( 4) Art. 3 9 ("Iraqis are free in their adherence to their 
personal status according to their own religion, 
sect, belief and choice, and that will be organized 
by law"); 
(5) Art. 52 ("1st - Sessions of the Council of 
Representatives shall be public unless it is 
necessary to do otherwise. 2nd - Sessions reports 
shall be published in the way the council sees fit"). 
Some of the provisions seem to serve wholly symbloic 
functions; they do not prescribe behavior. See, e.g., 
(1) Art. 2(2) ("This constitution guarantees the 
Islamic identity of the maj01ity of the Iraqi people 
")· 
. . . . ' 
(2) Art. 3 ("Iraq is a multiethnic, multi-religious and 
multi-sect country. It is part of the Islamic world 
and its Arab people are part of the Arab nation"); 
2. The princi pal function of a constitution is to give directions to 
government ut ho behave. vemment' s rinci al 
functions are law-mak" g, law-implementaf on, and 
adjudication. How adequate are the provisions f~ these in 
the draft constitution? 
a. The legislative function 
(1) Elections: Everything is left to future law. Art. 
48(3) - S' 4 f I J( i){&l) 
(a) Especially, nothing re the basic structure of 
elections (esp PR vs first-past-the-post, or 
party list vs individual candidacy) 
✓ (2) Public participation: 
(a) Sessions of COR "shall be public unless it 
deems otherwise." Art. 52(1). (NB nothing 
on public inputs to the law-making process). 
(b) Minutes to be published "in means regarded 
as appropriate by the Council." Art 52(2). 
(3) Parliamentary privilege: In general, to be regulated 
by law. Art 61(1) 
(4) Parliament is limited to an extent by the provisions 
of the H.E.._.l'!!_an Rights provisions. That is not very 
much of a limit. Free speech and press, for J 
example: 
~" ~ l()'t> J ~ • "1 ,._~i,vt! 
(a) Art. 36 "The state shall guarantee in a way 
that does not violate d and 
C 
., morality: 
-
"A. Freedom of expression using all the 
means. 
B. Freedom of press, printing, 
advertisement, media and publication. 
C. Freedom of assembly and peaceful 
demonstration and this shall be regulated by 
law." 
(5) Provisions to ensure the quality of discussion and 
information within COR: Nothing re research 
reports. 
(6) Nothing requiring local offices for COR members, 
or requiring regular report-backs to constituency. 
(7) Nothing detailing the procedure by which a bill 
gets drafted, or public participation in the drafting 
process. 
V 
b. 
(8) Nothing on requiring transparency re: conflicts of 
interest (e.g. , a 'Leadership Code' or a Declaration 
of Assets by COR members). 
(9) 
co 
Zero detail on the Federation Counci 
--------
Rule-making. 
Cf-,"\ p,3; 
~-1/,r~ 
~l~I) 'I/(// 
r,...,_ ... ,) ) 
(1) Art78(3) Cabinet exercises power "to issue rules , 
instructions and decisions for the purpose of 
implementing the law." NB no further procedures 
mentioned .. 
3. The execut ive: Nothing to ensure good governance. 
V 
a. Provisions ensuring effective governance. 
( 1) Provisions concernin qualifications for offic 
(2) 
(a) President: Art. 66 (only provision re: 
competence states nominee for ' resi en 
must have "a good re utation and olitical 
ex~ce" S ome requirements re: integrity 
- e.g. "god reputation, known for integrity , 
righteousness, fairness and loyalty to the 
homeland."). 
i) NB nomination to be regulated by a 
law. Art. 67. 
(b) PM: same qualifications as President. A rt. 
75(2) 
V 
✓ 
V 
4. 
Council of Representatives. ii, law shall 
regulate their function." 
(b) Art. 124. "The President of the Republic, the 
Prime Minister , members of the Council of 
Ministers, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, his two deputies and 
members of the Council of Representatives , c 
members of the Judicial Authority and 
people of the special grades may not use 
their influence to buy or rent any of the State 
properties, or to rent or sell any of their 
assets to the State, or to sue the State for it or 
to conclude a contract with the State under 
the pretense of being building contractors, 
suppliers or concessionaires." 
b. Structure and process of Cabinet and ministries: All left 
to future laws and regs. Arts. 83, 84. 
C. Public administration: Art. 105 is only provision: "A 
council named the ederal Public ervice Council shall 
be established and shall regulate the affairs of the federal 
public service, including the appointment and promotion. 
A law shall regulate its formation and competencies ." 
d. 
\O' 
Public fman~e: - )"-l- I 9J) "-° cftN'U' to rv--/r.J. ~~ '" ( (p, ~I J 
Judiciary 
a. Higher Jurid ical Council: see above - all left to future 
law. 
b. Fed Supreme Court: Requires an e~ct that will 
determine the number of Islamic scholars serving on the 
--court. Art. 90(2) 
5. Independent Commissions 
a. NB paucity of detail re: independent commission 
mentioned. 
6. Addressing peculiar ly Iraqi issues: 
vv a. CT§? erah srill- the chief issue in the power struggle. About 
this, what va ue ess emains is the result of an 
il).£Q__mP-lete bargaining process. + ~ .... ~ }-• \fi"'i 
(1) NB that the J?Ower to tax is not mentioned in Art. 
108 (exclusive Federal competencies) or in Art.111 
(shared competencies). Do only Regions and 
govemorates have the power to tax? 
(a) Munici alities presumably have power to 
tax only if granted by the Regional or 
independent govemorate government? 
(2) See Art 63 (Establishes a 'Federation Copuncil", 
with reps from regions and govemorates not in a 
Region. The clause then states: "A law, enacted by 
as two-third majority oft e members of the 
Council of Representatives shall regulate the 
Federation Council formation, its membership 
conditions and its specializations and all that is 
connected with it." [! ! !] 
(3) Art 115: "The Council of Representatives shall 
(4) 
enact, in a period n ot to exceed six months from 
the date of its first session, a law that defines the 
executive rocedures to form regions,. b y a simple 
majoricy." (I.e., majority- presumably Shia - will 
~ 
determine procedures for forming Regions!) 
See, e.g., Art. 110( (oil t be managed b~ fed 
gov't with "producin govemorates and the 
regional governments" to manage, and distribute 
oil monies according o the following 
-- ---
I 
b. 
, C. 
(5) 
fair manner in pro ortion to the o ulation 
mstribution in all parts of the country with a set 
allotment for a set time for the damaged regions 
that were unjustl y deprived by the former regime 
and the regions that were damaged later on, and in 
a way that assures balanced development in 
different areas of the country, and this will be 
managed by law." 
See also detailed provisions re: regions, Arts. 113-
118 
Also note paucioty of details re: municipal overnment 
(Art. 122: "This Constitution sha guarantee the 
administrative, political , cultural and educational rights 
for the various nationalities, such as Turkmen, Caldeans. 
Assyrians and all other components. A law shall regulate 
this." [That is the entire provisions re: local government!] 
-
Economic development: The only certain thing is that it 
tries to ensure neo-liberal development: 
~ 
., ~,-
1) Re· il Art. 110(2): Fed gov't with producing 
(2) 
v-y 
\ regions and governorates together to "fromulate 
policies to develop oil and gas wealth in a way that 
achieves the highest benefit to thje Iraqi people 
using the most advanced techniques of thje p[arket 
principles and encourages investment." [emphassis 
added][. 
Re: ec dev generally: 
(a) Art. 25: "The State shall guarantee the 
reform of thne Iraqi economy in accordance 
with moden1 ecobnomic principles to ensjre 
the full rninvestment oif its resources, 
diversification of its sources and tthe 
-encopuragement and develoipment of !!!g.e 
private sector." 
I ( 
(b) Art. 26: "The state shallo guarantee the 
encouragement of invwestmentsd in the 
varwus sectors. A law shall regulate this." 
C. Whose and what behavior constitute the social problem addressed. 
1. The power elite that actually controlled the drafting exercise 
paid attention onlx, to issues of power and goodies. 
~ V ""-"ll#n.• l . tU1. I I \ •1 
V. Explanations 
A. Preliminary note: We were excluded from the negotiations, and have 
no warranted explanation for the reportedly non-democratic method of 
negotiating the draft constitution, which apparently effectively 
excluded most of the constitutional committee members. 
B. Part of explanation: the Rule in effect is the TAL, which stipulated the 
short time frame (and which ultimately expressed Bush's political 
age~ he needed the constitution for his exit strategy). 
C. Part. of explanation: Two subjective ones seem obviuous 
1. Interest in positions, and parochial, loyalties. 
2. Neo-liberal ideologies of some of key negotiators? 
D. Part of explanations: 
1. Capacity of drafters: 
a. The technical drafting skills exhibited in the draft 
document are very low. 
(1) E.g. repetition oflocation of the capiutal. (Arts.11 
and Art. 121) 
VI. 
(2) Grouping and ordering is undecipherable. E.g. 
provisions re language and armed forces in Section 
One ("Basic Principles"). 
b. No apparent theory of constitution-making. 
2. Opportunity: In the attempt to settle power disputes at same 
time as draft a constitution, ended by leaving all the non-power 
issues - i.e., most of the constitution - for later determination. 
Hence the persistent vagueness in most of the constitution. 
a. Compare South Africa experience, where first negotiated 
issues of power, then spent two years drafting the 
constitution of 1996! 
b. No transparency in the drafting process 
3. Process: 
a. Members of COR Constitutional Committee: Most had 
little or nothing to say about significant details. 
(Members complained about their proposals going just so 
high, then hitting a glass ceiling). 
b. US Ambassador alleged to have taken a leading role in 
nego · ions; ega ffa1rs officer o ss1s ance 
Mission to aq (UNAMI) protested this; said US 
Ambassador actually circulated a US proposed version of 
Constitution. 
c. No input from po ulation at large. (Compare SA 
experience) -· -
Solutions: ( f ~ t ~ ) 
A, N ~• c,_:IIW.'-J' , - N...-
A. Time limits 
B. Solve power issues before attempting to draft a constitution 
(§ 
• t ., 
,. 
C. Ensure transparency in the drafting process, esp participation of 
populace in the process 
D. Train drafters in techniques 
E. Follow theory of democratic social change: 
1. Essence: 
a. Const. a charter of government 
b. It prescribes institutions of good governance. 
c. These should aim at specific, identified persistent social 
problems in Iran, as well as the general problems of good 
governance in Iran. 
(I) Especially, re economy, reconstruction of 
infrastructure , and security. 
F. Justify in tenns of public reason (i.e. 'reason informed by experience') 
l+-
